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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN "THE LARGER SCHEME OF THINGS
JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM*
The growing interest displayed by the law reviews in the legal
problems of local government reflects a gratifying increase in research
and scholarly activity in the field.' This interest on the part of law
school scholarly media is especially noteworthy, since the world of
legal education has a peculiar responsibility to identify and engage
in thoughtful study of the great legal problems of contemporary
society.
In this brief paper an effort is made to place the problem of making
appropriate legal provision for local autonomy in more adequate per-
•spective. That is a rather ambitious venture. One is moved by the
just demands of proportion and interrelationship in human affairs to
undertake it. Those who are sensitive to the importance of viewing the
r6le of the national state in the broader international perspective are
a growing company.2 There is occasion for acceleration of a parallel
development in outlook as to local units of government.
This is-hardly the day for parochialism. But to say this is not to
attack local self-government. It is by way of suggesting that an
adequate conception of the r6le of local government can be gained only
by regarding the political organization of society in proper perspec-
tive. There is nothing ultimate about any form of political organiza-
tion or any conventional governmental unit. Men resort to political
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; author, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW (1949).
1. See, for example, in addition to the present symposium, Municipal Home
Rule in Ohio, 8 O io ST. L. J. 1 (1948); Florida Municipal Law, A Symposium,
6 U. FLA. L. REV. 275 (1953); Land Planning in a Democracy, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1955); Urban Housing and Planning, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 351 (1955).
2. This is not to say that the vote is unanimous. One interesting straw in the
wind is the current posture of Senator Bricker's treaty power limitation pro-
posal. Upon adjournment of the first session of the Eighty-fourth Congress,
S. J. -Res. 1 still languished in committee in the Senate.
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organization to achieve individual and group ends. This being the
case, it appears appropriate to distribute governmental powers and
jurisdiction on a basis responsive to human needs. Put a little dif-
ferently, the community structure of society should be employed
realistically as the framework for political organization so that power
is proportioned to function and that jurisdiction and responsibility
have the same reach as the service or problem area.
In the state orientation there is a very important choice between
use of the state constitution as the direct instrument for allocating
governmental powers and reliance upon the legislature as a continuing
power-distribution organ in the state. As between the three branches
of the state government the primary allocation is, of course, made by
the constitution. More or less discretion may be left to the state legis-
lature even at this level. The devolution of authority to local units
has traditionally been a function of the state legislature under the
strongly prevailing doctrine of legislative supremacy over local gov-
ernment.3 It is here that the basic choice of political method presents
great difficulty. What factors militate in favor of modifying legislative
supremacy by constitutional amendment?
One of the outstanding features of the first state constitutions was
the preeminent position of the state legislature. 4 In marked contrast is
the relatively weak and ineffectual posture of the legislature under
the modern state constitution. Distrust of the state legislature has
long been a conspicuous characteristic of American political life. This
lack of confidence has been variously expressed in constitutional limi-
tations, both substantive and procedural. The traditional theory of
plenary state legislative power has, thus, been narrowed, far beyond,
the effect of bills of rights, by specific constitutional provisions. Famil-
iar examples, in the realm of substance, can readily be drawn from
the area of finance. Certain tax revenues may be constitutionally
dedicated to particular purposes.5 A legislature may be without power
to levy a graduated income tax.6 There may be no power in the legis-
lature to incur state debt, with the result that a constitutional amend-
ment is necessary for each state bond issue.7 It is in this way that a
legislature, without the power of decision, may pass the buck to the
3. For a very recent judicial reiteration of this familiar proposition, see
Opinion of the Justices, 114 A. 2d 879 (N. H. 1955).
4. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES,
1776-1860, 88 (1930).
5. There is the familiar example of constitutional amendments dedicating
motor vehicle license and fuel taxes to highway purposes. See, for example,
OHIO CONsT. art. XII, § 5a.
6. This is the effect of Pennsylvania's tax uniformity clause, as interpreted
by the courts. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Butcher v. City of Philadelphia, 333 Pa.
497, 6 A. 2d 298 (1938).
7. This is the practical effect of a ban on state debt except to supply casual
deficiencies of revenue, repel invasion, defend the state in war, or to pay
existing debt. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
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voters on hand-out proposals not tied to any plan of raising revenues
to pay the piper.
The legislatures are not even given the continuity and organizational
freedom of action to exercise well whatever substantive powers they
may have. Only a few meet annually in regular session.8 Most have
biennial regular sessions. 9 The biennial session is, in many, confined
to a relatively brief period.'0 Special sessions may be convened only
on call of the governor and may consider nothing beyond the call."
The prevailing theory that a legislature is functus officio, after ad-
journment sine die until duly reconvened, hampers interim activity
through regular standing committees.12
One finds in most state constitutions a number of rules of legislative
procedure and requirements as to form and style of legislation. 13 Some,
like the utterly obsolete requirement as to readings of bills, long since
lost whatever raison d'tre they may once have had.14 Others, like the
unitary subject provision, concededly have some genuine policy con-
tent.15
Since Lord Bryce penned his well-remembered dictum about the
failure of American city government,16 there has been very real prog-
ress in American municipal government and administration, progress
not generally matched in county government 1 and in the legislative
departments of the states. At this day the state legislature stands out
as our most "conspicuous failure." This is not an indictment of legis-
lators; it is a charge that we as state citizens have not developed strong
8. ZELLER and others, AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES 89 et seq. (1954).
9. Ibid.
10. In a number of states the limit is sixty days. In Alabama there is a ten-
day organization session in January followed by a session of not over thirty-six
legislative days beginning in May. ALA. CONST. Amend. LVII.
11. TENN. CONST. art. III, § 9.
12. See Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee, A
Survey and Critique, 33 COL. L. REV. 4, 11 (1933).
13. See the tabular material on Legislative Procedure in CoUmcn, OF STATE
GOVERNMENTs, BOOK OF 'E STATES 1954-55, 103 et seq. (1953).
14. Present day legislators can read. There are other, simpler ways of alert-
ing them as to the existence of bills, and reading to a legislative assembly has
no kinship with thoughtful deliberate study. The requirement, so far as
genuine reading in full goes, is a dead letter in any event.
15. See, for example, PA. CONST. art. III, § 3. It is designed to exact respon-
sible action on one thing at a time, as distinguished from the compromise and
bargaining involved in multi-subject logrolling. It is calculated, as well, to
protect the executive from disparate riders, which deny him. freedom to make
a clear-cut exercise of his power to approve or veto. The trouble is that the
requirement is coupled with a mandate that the subject of a bill be clearly
expressed in the title and the two together afford a ready basis for constitu-
tional attack in the courts and, thus, hardly helps to assure the security of
transactions. See Purdon's copious annotations to the Pennsylvania provision.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930 and current pocket part), PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
16. I AMERIcAN COMMONwEALTH 608 (1888).
17. Tennessee is a prime example of backwardness in county government.
Justices of the peace, constables and five other county officers are given con-
stitutional status. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 15 and art. VII, § 1. A Tennessee
county governing body is the court of quarter sessions, made up of the justices
of the peace of the county.
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and responsible state legislative institutions. So long as we expect
little of our state legislative bodies and relegate them, with curtailed
powers, to a part-time role in the governmental scheme of things, the
primary policy-making branch of state government will fail to play
adequately its vital role.
The deficiencies of the state legislatures cannot be fully overcome
by revising methods of districting and apportionment to assure fair
and balanced representation, important though such reform would be.
From the standpoint of the urban centers, which are generally under-
represented, population-wise, reapportionment would be no guaranty
of legislative respect for local autonomy. Members of the so-called
legislative delegation from a particular city may try to be a super
local governing body, especially when one major party is in power in
the legislature and the other in the city government. 18 The more
fundamental reform that is indicated is, we repeat, to make the legis-
latures truly responsible and, to that end, to assure them the sub-
stantive power and the organizational and procedural freedom pro-
portioned to their responsibilities.
This, however, is not to say that nothing should be done about dis-
tricting and apportionment. It can be urged with force that the problem
of representation should be adequately met before or concurrently
with the restoration of the legislature to a position of power and re-
sponsibility. Rural domination of a legislature in this metropolitan
civilization is not representative government. It hardly satisfies the
city folk to be told, as they were in Ohio in 1952 by persons opposing a
constitutional convention, that the rural citizen's vote is worth more
-because he is more stable and self-reliant and less susceptible to radical
influences! 19 Nor will they get fair representation by decrying existing
conditions. A sustained, organized effort is indicated.
Consideration of the problem of improving the state legislative insti-
tution and processes calls for reexamination of bicameralism. The
major historical reasons for bicameralism in the Federal Government
do not exist at the state level. The great compromise over House and
Senate representation helped achieve a federal union.20 A state is not
a federation of local units. It is a single political entity. One finds,
moreover, that a particular state constitution may make little distinc-
18. Desmond, States Eclipse the Cities, 44 NAT'L MUNIc. REV. 296, 298 (1955).
19. The writer was there; he heard the argument seriously urged.
It should be borne in mind that geographic representation is a different
matter. Its rational basis, one suggests, is that geographic areas have interests
which should have some legislative representation regardless of population.
The same could be said, of course, of economic representation., which is
achieved now principally through the unofficial medium of lobbying.




tion between the two legislative houses with' respect to the qualifica-
tions and terms of office of members.21
Perhaps the best argument for the unicameral legislature is that it
fixes responsibility in a single body and is calculated to focus party
responsibility as well. This is in keeping with the view that we should
give the legislatures genuine scope, that we should trust them. Along
with discretion goes accountability for its exercise, but difflusion of
responsibility makes it difficult to determine accountability effectively.
The relationship of this discussion of the state legislature to local
government is not difficult to make out. As the legislatures have been
constituted, they have been looked upon with something considerably
less than filial respect and confidence by local units, especially the
larger cities. This is understandable. It underlies the home rule move-
ment. The assumption is that we cannot depend upon the legislatures
to provide local government the powers and machinery, the inde-
pendence of decision and execution, requisite to the conduct of public
administration at the sub-state level on a responsible basis. The
prospect of adequate legislative recognition of local problems and
needs is considered so slight by the proponents of constitutional home
rule that they regard constitutional amendment as the only practical
recourse. They say, in effect, that life is too short; local government
cannot afford to wait on the vague prospect that the legislative insti-
tution will undergo the desired improvement. It is a familiar theme.
Let's by-pass the legislature and provide for this or that problem by
modifying the organic law.
One may be permitted to question the approach which has just been
described. To recognize the deficiencies of the state legislative institu-
tion is not to commit us to perpetuate them.' We are told that the
situation looks incurable, so we must, by constitutional provision,
protect municipal government from it. This, however, is to prefer
the tendency toward rigidity 'and the creation and continuance of
artificial governmental jurisdictions, which would characterize an
unqualified constitutional devolution of power to local government, to
meeting head on the problem of vitalizing our state legislatures. It is
to give slight, if any, heed to the hard, practical truth that a favorable
climate of judicial, legislative and public opinion is indispensable to
home rule, in any event.22 It is the way of expediency. It regards too
lightly the need of flexibility in governmental arrangements.
Preoccupation with assured provision for local autonomy can foster
21. See, for example, OHIo CONsT. art. II, § 2 and art. XV, § 4 (no difference
in qualifications or terms of office).
22. A change in the judicial climate has wrought wonders in Ohio. See the
discussion in AMERICAN MUNICIPAL Ass'N, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 11 (1953). Cf. Morris v. Roseman, 162 Ohio St. 447
(1954), criticized in 4 MUNICIPAL LAW SERVICE LETTER (Dec. 1954) and defended
in 5 MUNICIPAL LAW SERVICE, LE=TE (Jan. 1955).
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imbalance and hampering rigidity both in the distribution of govern-
mental powers and in the governmental configuration. One need not
labor the obvious complexity of the modern community, characterized,
as it is, by marked interdependence of individuals and groups. In
terms of the reach of governmental problems local unit jurisdictional
lines are highly artificial. The legislature is the active, continuing
power distribution organ in the state political structure. The problems
of a dynamic, interdependent society suggest greater rather than less
legislative freedom and responsibility in this respect. There is, doubt-
less, no better illustration of this than a major metropolitan area.
Contemporary America is a metropolitan civilization. Over half our
people live in metropolitan areas.23 Roughly one-fourth live in such
areas, which now or may soon overrun state lines.2 4 Yet we are hardly
on the fringe of the problem of achieving genuine metropolitan gov-
ernment with balanced recognition of metropolitan interests and those
of smaller community units within the metropolitan complex. We
have had the ingenuity to establish multi-state ad hoc units for limited
purposes, but have only just begun to consider seriously the legal and
practical difficulties involved in setting up multi-state general function
metropolitan units.
In some of the larger metropolitan areas there are scores of local
units all operating almost exclusively in their own relatively limited
domains. It is not unlikely that in a given state the statutes governing
incorporation of municipalities are so lacking in policy content that
additional incorporations may be easily achieved and further compli-
cate the problem of metropolitan integration. At the same time,
annexation laws hostile to municipal expansion may block extension
of the corporate limits of a primary city.25 If the powers and very
independent existence of a peripheral municipality, for example, are
placed beyond legislative control by the state constitution, that small
community may have a veto, so far as it is concerned, on all efforts at
metropolitan integration.26
It is true that there has been some rather ingenious improvisation in
dealing with problems which overreach local limits. This has included
resort to extraterritoriality, liberal annexation laws, functional con-
solidation, intergovernmental service contracts, ad hoc units of govern-
ment, expansion of county powers, city-county consolidation and
23. As of 1950 there were 84,500,680 people in standard metropolitan areas
and 66,196,681 outside of them. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' Ass'N,
MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 1955, 28.
24. COMvMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS 51 (June, 1955).
25. Here again, we look to Ohio for an example. Existing Ohio legislation on
original incorporation and territorial change is "hopelessly outmoded" and
"never had much policy content." Fordham and Dwyer, Municipal Incorpora-
tion and Territoritl Changes in Ohio, 13 OHIO ST. L. J. 503, 532 (1952).
26. Note the Texas doctrine as to the indestructibility of a home rule city.
City of Houston v. City of Magnolia Park, 115 Tex. 101, 276 S. W. 685 (1925).
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municipal consolidation.27 A notable development was the recent
creation of the federated Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto with
constituent units continued in existence for various functions not con-
ceded to be clearly metropolitan.2 Even in Toronto there is a long
way to go beyond the interesting start which has been made. There
are vexing questions as to further functional extensions of metropoli-
tan jurisdiction and of intergovernmental relationships within the
metropolitan framework. For example, Metro controls a network of
major streets but police administration and law enforcement are re-
sponsibilities of the constituent units.
The thrust of this discussion is that metropolitanism presents prob-
lems, which in importance, immediacy and difficulty appear to over-
shadow the struggle for greater municipal home rule. At the very
minimum, the realities of contemporary life tell us that local autonomy
should be viewed in the metropolitan setting.
It cannot be said that, thus far, such an outlook has been achieved.
Home rule thought has not, for the most part, been regeared in a way
to adapt to metropolitan developments. It has, however, been very
much alive.
In recent years interest in so-called municipal home rule has reached
a peak. Since 1950 five states have adopted constitutional amendments
bearing on the subject.2 9 This brings the total of states with some sort
of constitutional recognition of home rule to twenty-three.30 In each
of at least a half dozen additional states there are home rule stirrings.31
The dominant idea in these recent developments has been that home
rule, even though it be legislative and not constitutional in character,
32
is calculated to afford greater local autonomy, to bring some measure
of freedom from legislative domination.
33
There is no occasion to undertake here a thorough review of home
rule in theory and practice. An excellent general survey of the subject
27. Jones, Local Government Organization in Metropolitan Areas: Its Rela-
tion to Urban Redevelopment 477, 527 et seq. (Part IV of WOODBURY AND OTHERS,
THE FUTURE OF CITIEs AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, 1953).
28. Stats. of Ontario (2 ELIZ. II) c. 73 (1953).
29. GA. CONST. art. XV, § 1; LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 40; MD. CONST. art. XI-E
(see art. XI-A as to Baltimore); R. I. CONST. Amend. XXVIII; TENN. CONST. art.
XI, § 9 (Amendments 6 and 7, 1953).
30. The others are: ARIz. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 2 and 3; CALIF. CONST. art XI,
§ 6 et seq.; COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1-6; MIcH. CONST. art. VIII, § 20 et seq.
MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 36; Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 19 and 20; NEB. CoNsT. art. XI,
§§ 2-5; NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; N. Y. CoNsT. art. IX, §§ 9, 11-13; OHIO
CONST. art. XVIII; OKLA. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 2-7; ORE. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2 and
2a; PA. CONST. art. XV, § 1; TEx. CONST. art. XI, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5;
WASH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 10 and 11; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39 (a); Wis.
CONST. art. XI, § 3.
31. These include Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massa-
chusetts and North Carolina.
32. In no case was genuine constitutional home rule granted.
33. In Rhode Island home rule theory was so novel that it did not take
hold of the minds of the judges in the first test case. State of Rhode Island
ex rel. Flynn v. McCaughey, 99 A. 2d 482 (1953).
1955]
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is to be found in the recent report of the Chicago Home Rule Com-
mission.34 By way of more specific description of what we are talking
about, the following statement bears quoting:
"Existing constitutional provisions on municipal home rule can be
classified in terms of a variety of factors. The most conspicuous classi-
fication factor is self-execution. Home rule provisions may be self-
executing as to both the devolution of substantive powers and charter-
making, as to one or the other of these or as to neither. To the extent
that legislation is necessary to render any part of home rule available
the home rule pattern can be said to be legislative. Full-fledged con-
stitutional home rule is self-executing in both respects and puts some
matters considered local in character beyond legislative control.
"Another classification is based on the relationship of the grant of
substantive powers to the process of charter-making. Under what may
be termed the classic theory of home rule, the adjective process of
charter-making must be set in motion to render substantive powers
available. In contrast with this is a plan under which substantive
powers are granted directly by the constitution without regard to
charter-making." 35
It is apparent that legislative home rule leaves the legislature in the
saddle unless the constitutional provision on home rule is to be inter-
preted, as urged on behalf of Philadelphia, to mean that the legislature
is a one-way conduit of municipal powers.36 That, as yet unestablished,
theory does not comport with the traditional order of things under
which a state legislature may take away what it may grant, and has
not been accepted at every hand even by Pennsylvania proponents of
home rule.
37
The basic design of constitutional home rule is to place some areas of
local autonomy beyond legislative control. What might be called the
conventional home rule approach has been the employment of the
state concerns-local affairs dichotomy with a view to assuring home
rule as to local affairs.38 This distinction is so fundamentally deficient
in logical core that the courts had great difficulty with it right from the
start. It is rather ironical that, with sharp awareness of this problem,
the members of the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912 seized upon
another set of general terms, "all powers of local self-government," 39
which is affected by the same difficulty. More recently, we have been
told-that all will be well if we simply insert the word "purely" before
34. CHICAGO HOME RULE CoMnIssIoN, REPORT 193 et seq. (1954).
35. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL Ass'N, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 5, 6 (1953).
36. This is the position taken by Abraham L. Freedman, the able City
Solicitor of Philadelphia.
37. See White, Constitutional Changes in Matters of Home Rule and Munici-
, pal Government, 25 TEMP. L. Q. 428 (1952).
38. This does not, of course, characterize legislative home rule.
39. OHIo CONsT. art. XVIII, §§ 3 and 7.
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"local affairs" or "local self-government." 40 One supposes that this is a
way of construing "local affairs" strictly, but that is not to come to
grips with the real question as to what is the nature of a local concern.
This is an appropriate juncture at which to question pointedly the
assumption that governmental powers and functions are inherently
either general or local in character. Perhaps a lone example will.
suffice. Urban traffic presents acute governmental problems some of
which, at this stage in the life of a dynamic, mobile civilization, appear
appropriate for local policy determination and administration and
others not. We have state rules of the road and, in fact, a strong
movement for uniformity of state law on the subject. At the same
time, control of the urban traffic flow is left largely to local hands. One
would not expect it to be seriously urged that traffic control is inher-
ently anything in particular, from a governmental standpoint, even
though he might be tempted to declare it inherently difficult in char-
acter!
This general-local affairs distinction ranks with the governmental-
proprietary test in tort and other matters as a major contributor to
fuzziness of local government law doctrine and relatively high unpre-
dictability in application.41 The former is an assumption constantly
undercut by changes in society and the resulting responsibilities of
government. The latter is an arbitrary classification of the business of
government, which somehow denies some public activities the quality
of "governmentalness" although conducted by government. It has lost
some ground in the judicial forum due, in considerable part, no doubt,
to relentless critical commentary of legal scholars.4 Both deserve
repose in limbo.
The National Municipal League has, in its draft of a Model State
Constitution, undertaken to meet, the core problem of formulating a
home rule grant by, first, expressing a broad devolution of power andi
second, spelling out a partial enumeration of home rule powers with a
view to putting them definitely in the local orbit.43 This enumeration,
however, is made subject to the power of the legislature to enact laws
of statewide concern uniformly applicable to every city.44 Thus, we
find the League riding the highly vulnerable state-local concerns dis-
tinction into a climate of intellectual confusion more congenial to
litigation than deliberate policy adjustments.
Nor is specificity a happy resolution of'the basic difficulty. It is only
fair to say that the NML diaft is not necessarily inflexible. With
40. COMMITTEE ON STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE Gov-
ERNMENTS, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS 172 (1946).
41. CHICAGO HOME RULE COMMISSION, REPORT 219 et seq. (1954).
42. For references in the torts field see Repko, American Legal Coinmentary
on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Lability, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 214
{1942).




changes in conditions a court might consider that to be a state concern
which was formerly otherwise regarded. But this depends on the un-
avoidably unpredictable course of judicial interpretation. As to enum-
erated affairs judicially categorized as local, moreover, the desideratum
of local autonomy is simply assumed to outweigh the value of freedom
of legislative action to make provision for the effective meeting of
problems on an adequate geographical and social base.
Two years ago the American Municipal Association published
"Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule," in the
drafting of which this writer had a hand and which he likes to think
brings a fresh approach to the key problem of home rule theory.45
Certainly it can be said that this draft has provoked reflection and dis-
cussion, and that, without more, is encouraging.
The central idea of the AMA draft is that, while no substantive
municipal powers are to be put beyond legislative control, a home
rule municipality, as such, receives by direct constitutional devolution,
all substantive powers, which the legislature could under the con-
stitutional system of the state, devolve upon it, except those expressly
denied by statute or the home rule charter.46 Under such a dispensa-
tion a charter city would have all that the legislature could give except
to the extent expressly denied, which is substantially the reverse of the
traditional pattern.
It is readily granted that the AMA theory is not so clear and sharp
as to be practically self-interpreting. It leaves room for constitutional
questions as to what powers a legislature may devolve upon a local
unit. It wipes out, however, the major trouble zone created by the
general-local concerns distinction. This significant feature of the draft
seems to have eluded the Chicago Home Rule Commission. In the
splendid report of that body there is a review of the AMA and other
proposals to meet the central problem of home rule theory, which
concludes as follows'.
"None of the proposals appears to come to grips with the basic
difficulty, namely, the evaluation and determination, by generally ac-
ceptable criteria, of the powers which should rest within the orbit of
municipal autonomy and the nature and scope of reserved legislative
supremacy." 47
In defense of his own handiwork, the writer "allows" that the AMA
draft does come to grips with the basic difficulty. The Chicago com-
ment presupposes fixed criteria. The AMA draft, on the other hand,
both recognizes that local autonomy does not depend upon a constitu-
tional formulation making a local unit an imperium in imperio and
meets the so-called basic difficulty by giving charter cities all powers
45. See Fordham, Home Rule-AMA Model, 44 NAT'L MumIc. REv. 137 (1955).
46. See Section 6 of the draft and supporting comment.
47. CluCAGo HoME RULE COMMISSION, REPORT 222 (1954).
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which the legislature could grant them, subject to the continuing au-
thority of the legislature to deal with any governmental problem as
the -occasion-might-require. This may not be the best constitutional
attack on the problem, but it does provide a rational approach
unclouded by traditional home rule theory.
The fact that a favorable climate of opinion is very important to the
maintenance of genuine local autonomy, grounds the suggestion that
it is quite possible to make effective legal provision for local self-
government without constitutional change. One of the most effective
devices directed to this end is a general law giving the electors of a
municipality the option of a number of forms of government supported
by a liberal grant of substantive powers.
When New Jersey revised the state constitution in 1947, home rule
was considered and deliberately rejected.4 The legislature was left
with authority to provide an optional charter system and the courts
were expressly exhorted to interpret constitutional and statutory pro-
visions relating to municipalities liberally in their favor.49 A liberal
optional charter law has since been enacted. One of its most interest-
ing features is provision for election of a charter commission to study
the governmental needs of the community and come forward with a
recommendation as to choice of plan of governmental organization. The
range of choice embraces retention of existing charter unchanged,
legislative amendment of the existing charter, legislative enactment of
a new charter by special law and adoption of any one of the optional
forms under the general optional charter law. Adoption of an optional
plan is accomplished by referendum.
With respect to substantive powers, it is to be noted that the optional
charter law makes a generous devolution of authority capped with the
declaration that the object is to grant the maximum local self-govern-
ment possible under the New Jersey Constitution.5 0
Perhaps it has been made to appear that "local" is a pretty relative
term, that the problems of local government should be approached in
a perspective as broad as the actual reach of the problems. It is good
that responsibility for policy decision and execution be rested upon the
organized community. There is, however, always the question as to
what is the appropriate community for the particular governmental
function. The needs of a dynamic metropolitan civilization will not be
met by resort to a static concept of state-local relations to answer that
question. Given a fairly favorable climate of opinion, local autonomy
can be preserved at the same time that the requisite adaptability in
governmental arrangements is assured.
48. Faulkner, New Road to Home Rule, 44 NAT'L MI mc. REV. 189 (1955).
49. N. J. CoNsT. art. 4, § 7, par. 11.
50. N. J. STAT. ANN. 40:69 A-30 (Supp. 1954).
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